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Abstract. We present a variant of Chaum’s voter verifiable election
scheme that preserves the essential characteristics of the original whilst
being significantly easier to understand and implement.
1 Introduction
Since the dawn of democracy, human ingenuity has grappled with the challenge
of devising a truly trustworthy voting system, [1]. Such a system should pro-
vide voters complete confidence that their vote will be accurately recorded and
counted whilst at the same time guaranteeing the secrecy of their vote. The
challenge lies in reconciling the conflicting requirements of accuracy and secrecy.
Most traditional approaches to this problem involve placing significant trust
in the technology, mechanisms or processes. Thus, for the traditional paper bal-
lot, the handling of the ballot boxes and counting process must be trusted, that
the boxes are not lost or manipulated and that the counting process is accurate.
Various observers can be introduced to the process which helps to spread the
dependence but does not eliminate it.
In the US, lever and punch card machines have been used for over a century.
Here again the technology must be trusted, e.g., that the appropriate counters
are incremented correctly, the counts correctly recorded and aggregated etc.
Similarly, the more recent touch-screen machines call for trust in the design,
implementation, evaluation and maintenance of the software and hardware.
In such cases the assurance is extremely fragile: the failure of any of these
steps can undermine the goals. Furthermore, many of these machines fail to
provide any form of audit trail, so failures may go undetected and recounting is
impossible. This observation has prompted a number of experts to argue for the
incorporation of paper audit trails with such machines. This seems to provide,
at best, a short term fix to a fundamentally flawed approach.
In [4], Chaum presents a digital voting scheme that enables voter verification,
i.e., provides each voter with the means to assure themselves that their vote has
been accurately included in the vote tally. This scheme ingeniously combines
a number of cryptographic techniques and primitives to provide a high degree
of transparency whilst at the same time preserving ballot secrecy. Rather than
having to place trust in the components to perform correctly, steps of the vote
recording and tallying process are published and closely monitored to detect any
malfunction or corruption.
Another way to phrase this is to observe that the Chaum scheme provides
sufficient transparency to enable us to verify that a particular election has been
executed correctly. Most other schemes must derive their assurance by attempt-
ing to verify that the system will behave correctly and hence infer that, in any
particular instance, the election will be executed correctly. As remarked earlier,
the latter approach is significantly less robust than the former.
We still have to depend on certain properties of the cryptographic algorithms
and protocols. It is possible that there are flaws in the algorithms and protocols,
but here we have the advantage that they are made public and can be scrutinised
by anyone with the expertise and motivation.
The key elements of the Chaum scheme are:
– provide the voter with a receipt showing her vote in encrypted form.
– reveal the decryption of the receipt to the voter in the booth.
– provide a mechanism to catch any attempt by the voting device to decouple
the decryption shown to the voter in the booth from the decryption passed
on to the tellers.
– enable the voter to check, via a web bulletin board, that her encrypted ballot
receipt is entered into the tally.
– have a number of tellers perform a Chaum anonymising mix on the batch of
encrypted ballot receipts.
– post all intermediate steps of the tellers processing to the web bulletin board.
– perform random audits on the teller transformations to detect failures by
the tellers to perform the decryptions correctly.
The point of the encrypted receipt is to provide the voter with a way to check
that her ballot is entered into the tallying process and indeed, if their receipt
has not been included, to prove this to a third party. The fact that the vote
appears in encrypted form ensures that there is no way for the voter to prove
to a third party which way she voted. Voters can visit the web bulletin board
and check that their (encrypted) ballot receipt has been correctly posted. The
tellers process these posted receipts and mechanisms are in place to ensure that
all posted receipts are entered into the tallying process. The decryption in the
booth enables the voter to verify that their voting intent has been accurately
captured. The challenge is to ensure that the decryption performed by the tellers
will reveal the intended vote, i.e, identical to the decryption shown to the voter
in the booth.
The anonymising mixes performed by the tellers ensure that there is no link
between the encrypted ballot receipt and the decrypted version that is finally
output by the tallying process. The various checks serve to ensure that any
attempt by either the voting devices or the tellers to incorrectly decrypt a bal-
lot will, with good probability, be detected. More precisely, the chance of the
corruption of n ballots going undetected falls off exponentially with n.
The original scheme uses visual cryptography to perform the decryption in
the booth. Once the voter has made her selection, the voting device prints pat-
terns of pixels to two transparent sheets in such a way that, as long as the sheets
are correctly overlaid, the ballot image is revealed. When separated, each sheet
comprises a random pattern of pixels revealing nothing about the vote.
The design philosophy behind the scheme is to avoid the need to place any
trust in the system components. Following this philosophy, it is essential that
the decryption process in the booth be transparent and not depend on the in-
tercession of any hardware or software devices, as these might be susceptible to
failure or corruption.
In this paper we outline a variant of the original proposal that sidesteps much
of the complexity of the original arising from the use of visual cryptography. The
variant presented here is, in turn, based on an earlier variant presented in [3],
which replaced the visual cryptography of Chaum’s original by an encoding
of votes in terms of a pair of aligned paper strips. There, the ordering of the
candidates was taken as fixed and the encoding of the vote done in terms of the
match or mismatch of pairs of symbols in each candidate field.
The key innovation of this variant over the previous one is to allow the can-
didate ordering to vary from voter to voter. This further simplifies the presenta-
tion and implementation and gives a more intuitive representation of the voter’s
choice. Indeed, in this version, the ballot representation takes on an entirely
familiar form. A pleasing spin-off of this implementation is that an additional
degree of fairness is achieved in that the random variation of the candidate order-
ing will counter any tendency to a bias arising from a fixed order. A consequence
of this is to suggest that the checkerboarding construction of the original may
not in fact be necessary. The checkerboarding involved introducing redundancy
in the cryptographic material and spreading this between the two components
of the receipt.
We refer this latest version as “Preˆt a` Voter”.
2 An Example
The scheme is probably best introduced by way of a simple example. We will
give a more formal and detailed description later.
Suppose that there are four candidates and these are given a base ordering:
Anarchist
Alchemist
Nihilist
Buddhist
Our intrepid voter Anne first authenticates herself and registers at the polling
station. She now enters a booth and logs onto the voting device. She might for
example be provided with a smart card or one-time-password to enable her to
cast exactly one vote.
The voting device generates a unique serial number q associated with this
voting session. Alternatively, q might be preassigned to Anne by the electoral
register or similar. From q, the voting device now cryptographically generates
a random offset that, given that here we have 4 candidates, will be a number
from the set of elements of Z4, i.e., {0, 1, 2, 3}. The order in which the candidates
will be presented to Anne on the touch screen and, in due course printed on the
ballot receipt, will be the base ordering cyclically shifted by this offset. Suppose
that for Anne the voting device assigns an offset of 2. In this case she will see
the candidate ordering as:
Nihilist
Buddhist
Anarchist
Alchemist
Anne is now invited to make her selection amongst the candidates. Suppose
that she chooses Buddhist. This should now appear on the touch screen in fa-
miliar form as:
Nihilist
Buddhist X
Anarchist
Alchemist
If she now signals her okay to this, the voting device now prints this off along
with some additional information:
Nihilist 0
Buddhist X
Anarchist 0
Alchemist 0
q q
DollL DollL
DollR DollR
Where q is the serial number assigned to her ballot. We will come to the
significance of the Dolls shortly. Anne should now confirm that the printout
accurately reflects her selection, i.e., in this case the cross appears against Bud-
dhist. She should also check that the serial number and Dolls exactly match
in the two columns. If she is happy that all this is okay, she again signals her
confirmation via the touch screen. At this point the voting device will invite
her to choose between the left or right columns. Suppose that she chooses the
left. Now the voting device will print some further information: a cryptographic
seed , seedL, for the left column as well as ”RETAIN” in the left column and
”DESTROY” in the right column, thus:
Nihilist 0
Buddhist X
Anarchist 0
Alchemist 0
q q
DollL DollL
DollR DollR
seedL 0
RETAIN DESTROY
At this point, if she is happy with everything (in particular that the vot-
ing device has printed ”RETAIN” and ”DESTROY” on the appropriate strips),
Anne should detach the entire printout from the printer and separate the two
columns along a perforation down the middle. She leaves the booth and sur-
renders the right strip, marked ”DESTROY”, to an official and witnesses its
destruction, for example in a shredder with transparent sides. She should retain
the other strip as this will constitute her encrypted receipt. She is thus left with:
Nihilist
Buddhist
Anarchist
Alchemist
q
DollL
DollR
seedL
RETAIN
Note that this strip alone does not reveal which way she voted. This can only
be determined if the right strip, that carries the X marking, is correctly aligned
against it. Equally, had Anne actually chosen the right column, she would have
been left with a receipt of the form:
0
X
0
0
q
DollL
DollR
seedR
RETAIN
Again, this strip alone does not reveal which way she voted without knowing
the order given to the candidate list as shown on the left hand strip. The latter
varies (pseudo-)randomly from voter to voter and so is not known without the
left hand strip. Note further that, in this case, a different seed, seedR, is revealed.
2.1 The Role of the Dolls
We now explain the significance of the dolls. DollL carries, in encrypted form,
the information necessary to reconstruct the candidate ordering as shown on the
left strip. Similarly, the right hand doll, DollR, carries the information required
to determine the placement of the X in the right hand column. These are just
the offset values drawn from Z4. Thus, in our example, the left offset, ol is equal
to 2, the right, or equal to 1. Here we have adopted the convention that the base
ordering of the right hand strip is X, 0, 0, 0. Thus a placement of the X given by
0, X, 0, 0 corresponds to an offset of 1. The encryptions are performed using the
public keys of the tellers. We will give a detailed account of the construction of
the dolls a little later.
Anne should now have her retained receipt checked for well-formedness.
Checker devices provided by various independent groups should be made avail-
able in the polling stations. Thus, there is no need to depend on these com-
ponents of the system. Voters can choose between checkers or even run several
independent checks. Dependability thus arises from diversity and redundancy.
The purpose of these checks it to catch attempts by the voting device to
corrupt votes by burying the wrong offset information in the dolls. Note that
it is important that both dolls appear on both strips and exactly match. If the
voting device tries to cheat with either doll it faces the prospect of being detected
by these checks. We will detail these checks later when we have presented the
precise cryptographic construction of the dolls.
3 Construction of the Ballot Receipts
We hope that the above description has provided the reader with the key intu-
ition. We now give some of the mathematical details.
3.1 Construction of the Cryptographic Seeds and Offsets
The voting device has two independent secret keys SKl and SKr. The serial
number q encrypted using SKl gives the left seed sl:
sl := {q}SKl
The cyclic offset, ol of the candidate list is given by taking this value modulo
v, where v is the number of candidates or options:
ol := sl (mod v)
The right hand seed is a little more delicate as it cannot be freely chosen but
must reflect the voter’s selection. This can be achieved as follows:
compute an initial right seed, r′r by:
s′r := {q}SKr
If this initial value, taken modulo v, gives rise to the desired offset, corre-
sponding to the voter’s choice, we can simply set sr to this value. If this initial
value doesn’t map into the correct offset we increment it until we find the first
value that does. This value will be taken as the right hand strip seed value.
Suppose that the required right offset to correctly position the X to encode the
voter’s choice is or. Then the right seed is given by:
sr := s
′
r + (or − s
′
r(mod v))
The point of this algorithm is to ensure that the right seed is uniquely de-
termined once q is known and the voter choice is made. This is important as it
avoids any possibility of the voting device encoding information about the voter
choice in the choice of cryptographic variables.
3.2 Construction of the Dolls
Suppose that there are k tellers. For technical reasons that are presented in [4] or
[2], each teller performs two Chaum mixes and, accordingly, has two secret/public
key pairs assigned to it. The dolls are formed by nested encryption of the seeds
under these public keys:
Dl := {{{. . . , {{left, sl}PKT
2k
}PKT
2k−1
. . .}PKT3}PKT2}PKT1
Similarly:
Dr := {{{. . . , {{right, sr}PKT
2k
}PKT
2k−1
. . .}PKT3}PKT2}PKT1
Note again that, given q and the voter’s selection, the construction of the
strips is exactly determined (by the cryptographic functions). This denies the
voting device any opportunity to leak information in the way it resolves non-
determinism. This is also a feature of the original Chaum scheme. The left and
right flags buried in the innermost doll are to enable the correct interpretation
of the vote once the tellers have performed all their decryptions and mixes.
For convenience later we introduce a little more notation for the intermediate
nestings of the dolls.
Dl,1 := {left, sl}PKT
2k
Dl,i−1 := {Dl,i}PKTi−1
Dl := D2k
4 The Role of the Tellers
The role of the tellers is to perform a Chaum anonymising mix on the batch of
encrypted ballot receipts. This ensures that the decrypted votes that emerge at
the end of mix cannot be linked back to the encrypted receipts that are input
to the process. Aside from some minor differences, the role of the tellers and the
auditors are essentially as in the Chaum original. For completeness we give a
brief overview here. More detailed descriptions can be found in [4] or [2].
Once all the ballot receipts have been posted to the web bulletin board, a
simplifying transformation is performed on them before they are passed to the
first teller. All that the tellers need from the receipt is the numerical value of
the offset for the retained strip and the doll for the discarded sheet. All other
information can be discarded. Teller1 collects the resulting offset/doll pairs and
performs its anonymising mixes, as depicted in Fig 1.
The first, left hand column, of the bulletin board shows the receipts in exactly
the same form as the printed receipts held by the voters. The voters can check this
column to verify that their receipt has been accurately posted. The subsequent
columns show only the simplified representation: a pair consisting of the offset
value of the retained strip (a number from Zv) and the doll for the destroyed
strip. Other fields, such as the serial number q and the doll for the retained
strip will have been discarded. It is in fact essential that the serial numbers be
discarded at this stage or they could be used to track the receipts through the
mix. There is no shuffling between these first two columns and the correctness
of this simplifying transformation is readily and publicly verified.
For each offset/doll pairs in the batch on column two, Teller1 will:
– apply its first secret key to the outer doll D to reveal the enclosed doll D2k−1.
– apply a secret permutation to all the resulting offset/D2k−1 pairs.
– post the resulting, permuted pairs to the third column of the bulletin board.
Teller 1 now repeats this process on the contents of the third column and
using its second secret key. It will apply another secret shuffle, independent of
the previous one, to the batch. The resulting offset/D2k−2 pairs of this decryp-
tion/shuffle are now posted to the forth column.
Teller2 now takes the offset/D2k−2 pairs posted by Teller1 and performs a
further two mixes in the same fashion. This process is repeated by all the tellers
in sequence. When the last teller performs the final transformation it outputs
the fully decrypted dolls that reveal the seeds for the discarded strips paired
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Fig. 1. Teller1: anonymising mix
with the seeds on the retained strips. From these pairs the original votes are
readily derived. Note that, for convenience we dropped the left/right subscripts
in the above description as the distinction does not matter for the teller trans-
formations. The distinction will be significant at the final step, where the pairs
of fully decrypted offsets interpreted as vote values. For this purpose we bury a
left/right flag in the inner doll, along side the seed value.
The overall effect then is to have posted on the bulletin board, in the left hand
column, the batch of initial receipts along with the serial number and associated
decryption doll as posted by the voting device. In the right hand column we will
have the fully decrypted votes. In between there will be a set of columns with
the intermediate, partially decrypted sets of offsets/dolls. Each column will be
some secret shuffle of the previous one. Note that the encryption prevents the
permutation being reconstructed by simple matching of dolls.
Assuming that all the tellers perform their transformations correctly, there
will be a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of each column and
the next. The exact correspondence, which offset/doll pair in one column corre-
sponds to which offset/doll in the next column, will be hidden and known only to
the teller who performed the transformation between those columns. Thus, the
receipts will have undergone multiple, secret shuffles between the first column as
posted by the voting devices and the final decrypted column. This ensures that
no voter can be linked to her vote, so ensuring ballot secrecy.
The fact that several tellers are used gives several layers of defence with re-
spect to voter privacy: even if several of the tellers, but not all, are compromised,
the linkage of voters with their votes will remain secret.
The decrypted votes are posted in the final column so the overall count will
be checkable by anyone.
5 Checking on the Voting Device
The description so far has assumed that all the players, the voting device and
the tellers, have behaved correctly, in accordance with the rules of the scheme. If
everyone obeys the rules we can be sure that the election will be both accurate
and private. However, should the voting device or any of the tellers cheat then the
accuracy and privacy would be undermined. To have to place such dependence
on the components runs counter to the design philosophy of the Chaum scheme.
Rather than trust the devices or tellers, we carefully monitor their behaviour
via the bulletin board postings. To detect attempts by the voting device to cheat,
Anne should perform two checks. Firstly, she should run her receipt through a
checking device that verifies that the receipt has been correctly formed by the
voting device. Such checking devices should be readily available at the voting
station for example and provided by independent organisations, for example,
The Electoral Reform Society or similar.
The computations performed by the checker are as follows:
For a left hand strip, apply the voting device’s left public key to the revealed
seed and check that this yields the correct q:
{sl}PKl = {{q}SKl}PKl = q
This should be the seed embedded in the left doll. The checker can thus
recompute the value of the doll by applying the appropriate public keys of the
tellers. The value thus computed should match the value printed on the strip.
Finally, this seed value when taken (mod v) should give the offset shown on the
left strip.
To check a right hand strip, we need to confirm that the seed value given,
when taken (mod v), yields the correct offset as shown on the strip and is the
smallest seed value with this property greater or equal to the value computed
by:
sr = {q}SKr
The checker should also recompute the doll from the seed value and check
that this value agrees with that printed on the strip.
These checks ensure that if a malicious or corrupted voting device shows the
voter one decryption, then creates a false doll which would produce a different
decryption by the tellers, it has a strong chance of being caught out.
Note that the algorithms for these checks are publicly known, so in principle,
anyone could construct such a checker and make it freely available. Similarly
anyone could examine such a checker to establish that it was performing cor-
rectly. Indeed, if she is really enthusiastic, Anne may choose to run several such
independent checks. In principle, she could even write her own checker.
Once all the receipt batches have been posted to the web site, Anne should
also check that her receipt is accurately recorded there. Note also that routine
well-formedness checks could be run on all posted ballot receipts in addition to
the checks performed by the voters.
Thus, If the voting device tries to cheat by decoupling the doll information
for one of the strips it will face a 1/2 chance of being caught by such a check.
This assumes that:
– the voter’s choice of strip is not predictable by the voting device.
– the voter performs the check.
The validity of these assumptions will be discussed in a forthcoming paper.
Even if these assumptions are not quite right and the voting device actually has
a better than evens (but still less than 1) chance of predicting the voter choice
of strip, the probability of it being detected still approaches 1 as the number of
ballots it attempts to corrupt increases.
6 Checking on the Tellers
Checks must also be performed to detect any failure by the tellers to perform all
their transformations accurately, i.e. to ensure that they do not alter, remove,
inject or corrupt votes.
As in the original Chaum scheme, the auditing of the tellers can be based on
the notion of partial random checking proposed in [5]. For each teller an auditing
authority randomly selects half of the pairs from the teller’s input column and
requires the teller to provide the link information for these pairs, i.e., to reveal
the matching pair in the next column arising the teller’s first transformation.
Similarly for the teller’s second transformation, the auditor requires the teller to
reveal the links for the complementary pairs in the intermediate column, i.e, all
the pairs not pointed to by links audited in the teller’s first shuffle. This ensures
that there are no complete links across the two shuffles performed by any given
teller and so no ballot receipt can be traced across the mixes performed by any
given teller.
Suppose that for a revealed link the pair has been transformed thus:
oi, Di −→ oi−1, Di−1
It can now be checked that the following holds:
Di−1 = {Di}PKi
oi = oi−1
7 Conclusions
We have presented a variant of the Chaum digital voting scheme. This variant
preserves the essential features of the original whilst sidestepping the complexity
of the visual cryptography of the original. The presentation of the encoding on
the vote is quite intuitive and familiar. A pleasing spin-off is that the randomi-
sation of the candidate order counters any tendency to bias the voter choice that
might arise from a fixed order.
We should note that, in contrast to the Chaum original there is a marked
asymmetry between the strips. In the Chaum original the crypto material and
information bits are symmetrised and spread between the layers. This may have
cryptographic implications in that the checks that can be performed on the
right hand strips are not as tight as those performed on the left hand strips.
This appears not to introduce any vulnerability that could be exploited by the
voting device to corrupt receipts undetected, but this will be investigated in
future work.
This asymmetry may also introduce a stronger element of bias in voter choice
between strips. This may mean that some additional mechanism is needed to help
the voter simulate randomness in their choice of strip, maybe a coin in a perspex
cylinder for example.
A possible response to these concerns is to symmetrise the ballot receipts by
duplicating the representation of the vote. Thus we could have two independent
scramblings of the candidate list, one appearing on the left strip, the other on
the right strip, thus:
Nihilist
Buddhist X
Anarchist
Alchemist
Anarchist
Alchemist
Nihilist
X Buddhist
DollL DollL
DollR DollR
This seems somewhat inelegant but does avoid the concerns arising from the
asymmetry between the strips. The left doll conceals the seed from which the
offset of the candidate list on the left strip can be derived. Similarly for the right
doll. Now, as with the original scheme, we have values appearing on both strips
that are functions purely of the serial number q, independent of the voter choice.
This allows equally tight checks to be performed on either of the strips.
A further, perhaps more pleasing, variant of this symmetrised version is as
follows: instead of having both vote representations on each of the strips, we
separate these representations onto separate ballot forms. Voters will use pre-
prepared ballot forms, each with a perforation down the middle. They choose at
random two or more of these, e.g.,:
q
Nihilist
Buddhist
Anarchist
Alchemist
Doll
And
q’
Anarchist
Alchemist
Nihilist
Buddhist
Doll’
The voter chooses one of these with which to cast her vote, the others can be
checked for well-formedness. Suppose she chooses to vote on the second. The first
she can retain and run through checker devices (indeed a random sample of these
prepared ballots might have been pre-checked by an auditor and discarded). The
seed is revealed for the discarded ballot, the doll reconstructed and the offset
checked. On the second she puts her mark in the appropriate cell and detaches
and destroys the left hand side.
She thus retains, for a vote for the Buddhist candidate:
q’
X
Doll’
This forms the encrypted receipt and is passed on the the tellers, e.g., scanned
in and posted to the web bulletin board.
The nice feature of this is that there is no need to check matching of dolls.
A further observation is that the voter could presumably run a check on the
unused ballot before casting their vote. This avoids some of the messiness that
could arise in earlier variants when a voter discovers a mal-formed receipt after
casting their vote. Precautions need to be taken to prevent double voting. These
details will be discussed in a future paper.
For the purposes of illustration we have described how the scheme can be
used for a single vote system, i.e., in which voters get to choose just one of a
set of options or candidates. Where voters can rank the candidates in order of
preference (or indeed where they can vote for more than one candidate), we
could use full permutations in place of the simple cyclic shifts presented here.
In this presentation, in contrast to the Chaum original, the tellers do not
alter the offset values in the ballot pairs during the mix process. This makes for a
simpler description and implementation and should be fine as long as the number
of voters is significantly larger than the number of options. This does expose some
information about the routings through the shuffles and, particularly where the
ratio of voters to options is rather small, this might pose a problem. This could
be fixed by adding extra layer of hashing or randomisation in the construction
of the dolls and having the tellers use this in their transformations to change
the offset values. In fact, such an element of randomisation might in any case
be needed to foil guessing attacks on the mixes (a` la Chaum original). Details
of such attacks and the mechanism to foil them is detailed in [2].
Chaum’s original scheme used digital signatures on the receipts. This provides
added security and allows copies of receipts to be electronically transmitted. This
could also be incorporated in this scheme.
We will discuss such elaborations and present some analysis of the scheme in
a future paper.
Finally, we remark that the dependability of complex computer based systems
depends as much on socio-technical factors as on the purely technical details of
the design. We are currently studying the error handling and recovery strategies
for this scheme. This will appear in a forthcoming paper.
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